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  1 In a recent paper, Philippe Schmitter laments that “no theory of regional integration has been 
as misunderstood, caricatured, pilloried, proven wrong and rejected as often as 
neofunctionalism” (2002:1). And he goes on to explicate, embrace, and elaborate 
neofunctionalism in his inimitable way. Almost fifty years of neofunctionalism have taught us 
a thing or two about regional integration. Neofunctionalism identifies basic building blocs for 
any valid theory of the subject, and more generally, for any valid theory of jurisdictional 
architecture.  
Neofunctionalism argues that regional integration is shaped by its functional 
consequences—the pareto gains accruing to integration—but that functional needs alone 
cannot explain integration. Regional integration gives rise to potent political tensions. It 
shakes up relative capabilities, creates new inequalities, and transforms preferences. Above 
all, it leads to politicization, a general term for the process by which the political conflicts 
unleashed by integration come back to shape it. Neofunctionalists recognize that a decisive 
limitation of functionalism is that it does not engage the political consequences of its own 
potential success. What happens when the “objects” of regional integration—citizens and 
political parties—wake up and became its arbiters? 
In this essay, we begin by taking a close look at how neofunctionalism and its 
precursor, functionalism, conceive the politics of regional integration. Then we turn to the 
evidence of the past two decades and ask how politicization has shaped the level, scope, and 
character of European integration.  
 
 
FUNCTIONALITY AND POLITICS 
Neofunctionalism’s point of departure is that functional efficiency is the engine of regional 
integration. The functional premise remains a vital one in regional integration theory.  It 
grounds Wayne Sandholtz’ and Alec Stone Sweet’s transactionalist theory of supranational 
governance (1998; Sweet, Sandholtz, and Fligstein 2001), Mark Pollack’s application of 
principal-agent theory to the European Union (2003), and Andrew Moravcsik’s liberal 
institutionalist account of EU treaty making (1998).  
Functionalism identifies a rational basis for political choice. Welfare gains or losses—
Mitrany’s “common index of need” (1966: 159)—determine whether a particular policy will, 
or will not, be selected. Neofunctionalists counter that functional pressures are necessary, but 
not sufficient, to change the scope, level, or character of regional integration. They 
conceptualize three intervening processes. Functional spillover occurs when an original 
  2 integrative goal can be assured only by integration in a functionally related area. 
Externalization describes the pressure on the members of a regional regime to adopt a single, 
and therefore integrative, policy towards third parties. And most importantly, politicization 
describes a process by which regional integration becomes contested among a widening circle 
of political actors (Schmitter 1969).  
This stands in stark contrast to functional theory. Functionalism assumes the 
“inevitability of socio-economic gradualism and the supremacy of welfare and technology 
over power politics” (Pentland 1975: 9). Functional needs are presumed to have self-evident 
consequences for the scope, level, and character of regional organization. As integration bears 
fruit, so experts and beneficiaries learn that integration can effectively be extended to other 
practical, non-controversial needs. But there is a certain automaticity to the process. Hard 
political choices, political mobilization, and above all, conflict, are irrelevant or harmful. 
David Mitrany argued that successful integration requires consensus about practical goals and 
abstinence from power politics. As James Caporaso points out, “Functionalists . . . believe in 
the possibility of defining certain nonpolitical aspects of human needs, nonpolitical in the 
sense that there is a high level of consensus concerning them. Such areas are labeled 
‘technical’ or ‘welfare-oriented.’ . . .The end result would be a community in which interest 
and activity are congruent and in which politics is replaced by problem-solving” (1972: 27). 
Politicization is the point at which functionalists and neofunctionalists part company. 
For Ernst Haas, Leon Lindberg, and the early Philippe Schmitter, politics is not a drag on 
regional integration, but an essential ingredient. Haas’ Uniting of Europe: political, social and 
economic forces, 1950-1957 is a study of political calculation—of  “nationally constituted 
groups with specific interests and aims, willing and able to adjust their aspirations by turning 
to supranational means when this course appears profitable” (1958: xiv). Schmitter argues 
that, “alone, functional interdependence based on high rates of mutual transactions is 
impotent. It must be perceived, interpreted, and translated into expressions of interest, 
strategies of influence, and viable decision making styles” (1969: 164). Functionality—the 
pareto gains accruing from integration—is the engine, but politicization is the drive shaft—a 
decisive intervening variable—determining whether, when, and how functional pressures lead 
to regional integration.  
At its core, politicization refers to the increasing contentiousness of decision making. 
According to Philippe Schmitter, “Politicization . . . refers initially to a process whereby a) 
the controversiality of joint decision making goes up. This in turn is likely to lead to b) a 
widening of the audience or clientele interested and active in integration. Somewhere along 
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some collective recognition that the original objectives have been attained . . . and that the 
new ones involving an upward shift in either scope or level of commitment are operative. 
Ultimately, one could hypothesize that . . . there will be d) a shift in actor expectations and 
loyalty toward the new regional center” (1969: 166. Italics in original; alphabetization added). 
The early neofunctionalists were sanguine that politicization would raise the level and 
extend the scope of regional integration. A federal polity, or something like it, would result. 
Haas described the European Economic Community in 1958 as a “new centre, whose 
institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing ones” (1958: 16). He argued 
that “even though supranationality in practice has developed into a hybrid in which neither the 
federal nor the intergovernmental tendency has clearly triumphed, these relationships have 
sufficed to create expectations and shape attitudes which will undoubtedly work themselves 
out in the direction of more integration” (1958: 526-7; our emphasis). But as early as 1969, 
Schmitter was at pains to assume no automaticity, fixed sequence, or unidirectionality (1969, 
1970). Reflecting on the original research program three decades later, he stresses that neo-
functionalists had too rosy a view of the transformation of governance, and notes that “any 
comprehensive theory of integration should potentially be a theory of disintegration” (2002: 
2).  
So regional integration can contract as well as expand. Haas, Lindberg, and others 
began also to doubt their initial prediction of a single end-point, a European federation, and 
conceived of several possible outcomes. In a provocative piece initially written just after the 
Maastricht negotiations, Philippe Schmitter conceptualized non-state scenarios characterized 
by growing dissociation between territorial constituencies and functional competencies (1996; 
see also 2003: 15). Ironically, given their differences, neofunctionalists and functionalists 
converge in their speculations about the jurisdictional architecture of integration. Mitrany was 
a passionate opponent of federalism, which he felt was inappropriately rigid (1948, reprinted 
in 1966). Philippe Schmitter is skeptical of federal schemes for Europe, “because, in the 
immediate future, the Europolity is likely to retain the status of a ‘nonstate and nonnation’—it 
would be inappropriate and even counterproductive to define its citizens, representatives, and 
rulers in the usual manners for a large-scale, socially heterogeneous, advanced capitalist 
nation-state, that is, in the manner of a federal polity” (2000: 15). The most extreme non-state 
scenario conceptualized by Philippe Schmitter—condominio  (1996)—shares some basic 
features with David Mitrany’s functional vision. The European polity has no fixed center, but 
is a network of jurisdictions with variable membership, variable decision rules, and of 
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strengthened by politicization. 
 
 
THE STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL CONFLICT 
Neofunctionalism kicked off a thirty-year research program analyzing politicization in the 
European Union (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). In this period, one neofunctionalist 
prediction has come to pass: European integration has become more controversial, as Philippe 
Schmitter foresaw. What few predicted is that the sign would be negative.  
Support for European integration among the public has not risen, and in some 
countries has declined, since the early 1990’s (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993, 2003; Franklin, 
McLaren and Marsh 1994). Elites were always likely to be more favorably oriented to 
integration than the public as a whole; a fact that has become politically combustible as 
European integration has instigated 28 national referenda in 17 member and candidate 
countries.
1 In short, Leon Lindberg’s permissive consensus has been transformed into 
something approximating its opposite, a constraining dissensus (Olsen 2004; Hix 1999; 
Hooghe and Marks 1999; van der Eijk and Franklin 1996; Marks and Steenbergen 2004; 
Niedermayer and Sinnott eds. 1995).  
At the same time, the interested audience has widened, again as predicted by 
neofunctionalists. The mobilization of interest groups, social movements, unions, firms, and 
subnational governments at the European level has generated a broad stream of research 
substantiating the neofunctionalist expectation that, “Once a regional integration scheme is 
established, it may serve as the stimulus for private groups to create . . . regional organizations 
to reflect and protect their common interests ...” (Nye 1970: 205; Imig and Tarrow 2001; 
Marks, Haesly, and Mbaye 2002; Marks and McAdam 1996; Mazey and Richardson 2001; 
Streeck and Schmitter 1991; Wessels 2004). The issues arising from European integration 
reach deeply into political parties—the primary aggregators of political interests in European 
democracies—and into the public itself. 
Even in the early days, neofunctionalists were alert to the fact that domestic conflict 
about European integration could stretch beyond sectoral or business associations. Ernst Haas 
                                                 
1  This includes ten referenda in 2004 accession countries. It does not include anticipated referenda on the 
European Constitutional Treaty. As of April 9, 2005, nine countries (the Czech republic, Denmark, France, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom) had held or were going to 
have referenda. Source: Centre d’études et de documentation sur la démocratie directe in Geneva, Switzerland 
(http://c2d.unige.ch/, accessed April 9, 2005). 
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particular economic interests were concerned—a line of analysis that was later taken up by 
intergovernmentalists—but he was also keenly aware that political parties were decisive both 
for the creation of a coherent Euro-polity and because, in Europe, government is party 
government. In The Uniting of Europe (1958), Haas begins by describing in detail the 
positioning of political parties in the major party families, and moves on to national trade 
associations, trade unions, and national governments. 
The difference now is that decision making on the big issues has shifted away from 
iron triangles of producers to national contests which, in an increasing number of cases, 
involve national referenda. The positioning of political parties and of citizens has, since the 
Maastricht Accord, grown in relative importance while that of sectoral associations has 
declined.  
How, then, does conflict over European integration connect to the dimensions that 
structure public opinion and competition among political parties? The first of these 
dimensions is an economic Left/Right dimension concerned with economic redistribution, 
welfare, and government regulation of the economy. Contestation on this dimension has 
predominated in most Western nations in the postwar period (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Lipset 
and Rokkan 1967), and is diagnosed as the main dimension in Central and Eastern Europe 
(Evans and Whitefield 1993; Kitschelt et al. 1999). A second, non-economic or cultural, new 
politics dimension has gained strength since the 1970s in Europe—in the East as well as in the 
West (Evans and Whitefield 1993; Flanagan 1987; Franklin 1992; Inglehart 1977; Kitschelt 
1995). In some societies this dimension is oriented around environmental protection; in 
others, it captures conflict about traditional values rooted in a secular/religious divide; in yet 
others, it is pitched around immigration and defense of the national community. We therefore 
describe the poles of this dimension with composite terms: Green/Alternative/Libertarian (or 
Gal) and Traditionalist/Authoritarian /Nationalist (or Tan) (Hooghe, Marks, Wilson 2002).  
 
Left/Right 
When EU issues have distributional economic effects within societies—as is clearly the case 
for social policy, employment policy, and above all, for policies that reduce the transaction 
costs of international economic exchange—the positions that political parties take can be 
predicted from their left/right location.  
 
  6 Table 1: Left/right Positioning and Position on Economic EU Policies (correlations) 
Internal Market  0.34 
Employment –  0.53 
Cohesion –  0.25 
General Position  0.04 
Note: Data from the Chapel Hill 2002 party expert dataset, tapping 238 country experts to evaluate the 
ideological and EU policy locations of 98 political parties in the West (EU-15 minus Luxembourg). Experts 
locate parties on a scale from 1 (strongly opposed) to 7 (strongly favoring). Parties weighted by vote percentage 
in most recent national election. 
Internal Market: “Consider internal market liberalization. Some parties want to strengthen EU powers in the 
internal market and competition policy. Other parties are reluctant to support stronger EU powers for internal 
market liberalization.” 
Employment: “Consider EU employment policy. Some political parties want the EU to strengthen its common 
employment policy; they view EU employment policy as a means toward reducing unemployment. Other parties 
argue against a common employment policy.” 
Cohesion: “Consider EU cohesion or regional policy. This policy transfers resources to the poorest regions in 
the EU, and is the second item on the EU budget. Some political parties wish to maintain or expand the EU’s 
cohesion policy, whereas others wish to reduce or eliminate it.” 
General Position: “How would you describe the general position to European integration that the party’s 
leadership has taken over the course of 2002?” 
 
To return to the level/scope distinction, distributional politics directly engages the scope, but 
not the level of integration. Should the European Union spend money to diminish 
unemployment, aid poorer regions, or promote social cohesion? The debate is about for 
whom, from whom, and how much; it is not intrinsically about by whom. Simon Hix, Mark 
Pollack and others have pointed out that left/right speaks to supranationalism with many 
voices (Hix 1999; Pollack 2000). The logic, as in the United States, is one of “regime 
shopping” When liberals were ascendant at the federal level of the United States, 
conservatives found themselves convinced of the virtue of states rights. Now that 
conservatives are ascendant, it is the liberals’ turn. What matters is the structure of political 
opportunity as it exists in a particular time and place.  
In the context of the EU, the economic right is satisfied with the combination of 
market integration and nationally segmented political authority. Market integration involves 
the creation of a single market, a transnational goal that demands limited supranational 
authority. Neoliberals support European institutions, and the European Court of Justice in 
particular, when they limit national regulation—“negative” integration (Scharpf 1996).  So 
those on the economic right see the virtues of raising the level of integration, of central 
control over the distributional capacity of national states. But it would be self-defeating for 
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competition.  
Those on the economic left wish to create redistributive capacity at the European level, 
but they do not want to constrain redistribution and other social democratic policies at the 
national level.  Left parties were the chief concern of early integrators, including Jean 
Monnet, who realized that such parties might resist functional economic integration on 
distributional grounds. Monnet made every effort to persuade socialist party and trade union 
leaders that European integration deserved their support. By the late 1950s, Ernst Haas 
identified a “sinistration” of support for a federal Europe (1958: xiv). But the debate on 
European integration was still raging among French and British socialists in the early 1980s. 
Most socialists eventually came to the conclusion that if exit was impossible, they should try 
to extend the scope of integration to include the distributional policies that were in Jacques 
Delors' vision.  
  We detected this in the mid-1990s (Hooghe and Marks 1996, 1999), but in the 
meantime the left’s enthusiasm for the Delors project of regulated capitalism has cooled. 
Although European political economies are more welfare oriented and redistributive than the 
US, they vary in ways that make convergence on a single European model the least likely of 
future scenarios. Institutional variation across the EU sharply constrains the feasible scope of 
continent-wide regulation. Step by step integration—the (neo)functional recipe—is inhibited 
by country-specific institutional complementarities among institutions responsible for 
economic governance (Crouch and Streeck 1997; Streeck 1996; Hall and Soskice 2001).
2 
Moreover, institutional differences exist within, as well as among, countries that are said to 
have a particular type of governance. Denmark, for example, finances its welfare state 
primarily through income taxation, while Sweden relies to a much greater extent on social 
security contributions, a contrast that would complicate integration of these social democratic 
welfare regimes (Scharpf 1999). 
Moreover, social democrats have become acutely aware that redistribution is 
constrained by cultural diversity (Offe 2000). The relationship can be hypothesized as a “law” 
of culturally constrained redistribution: the more culturally diverse a polity, the smaller the 
scope for redistribution. At one end of the scale are encompassing global organizations, 
                                                 
2   Fritz Scharpf makes the point that preferences differ across countries in ways that decisively constrain 
integration. He observes that British would revolt against the high taxes that sustain the generous Swedish 
welfare state, that Swedes would not settle for a poorly funded educational system as in Germany; and that 
German doctors and patients would protest against attempts to emulate the British national health system 
(Scharpf 2001).  
  8 including the UN, the World Bank, and the WTO, that redistribute at most a tiny fraction of 
global GDP. At the other extreme are relatively homogenous national polities, which 
redistribute up to about one third of the national product. While the European Union is more 
culturally coherent than most other international regimes, it is considerably more diverse that 
the most diverse federal states. No other international or transnational regime redistributes 
anything like the 0.8 percent of GDP that the EU devotes to agricultural and cohesion 
funding. Because a shared sense of community is lacking in Europe, it is difficult for social 
democrats to campaign for more.  
  Given that neither the left nor the right has managed to achieve durable political 
hegemony at the continental level, and given high decisional barriers for institutional 
innovation, the struggle over economic redistribution has not done much to deepen 
integration.
3  
The main thrust of integration has been functional, not redistributive. The scope and 
level of regional integration in Europe has been constrained by the area of agreement between 
center left and center right on the collective benefits of internal peace and transnational 
economic exchange. European integration has largely followed the prescriptions of classical 
federalism: a) centralize those areas of public policy where economies of scale are present; b) 
internalize positive and negative externalities by encompassing in the relevant jurisdiction all 
those affected by the policy; c) otherwise, decentralize.  
Does this mean that left/right conflict has no bearing on European integration? Not 
quite. Functionalism is opaque. What does “affected by the policy” mean? Was slavery in the 
South an externality for those in the North of the United States? Does the denial of equal pay 
for women, or of political rights for immigrants, in one part of the Union “affect” citizens in 
another part? This invites a debate about the implications of cohesion in a political 
community, a debate that is fundamental to the left/right divide. The front line of 
redistributional conflict in the EU is in the application of European-wide regulation in areas 
such as social policy and environmental policy (Caporaso 2000; Falkner 1998; Leibfried and 
Pierson ed. 1995; Sbragia 1996). 
  So the conclusion to this section is double-edged. Distributional conflict has not driven 
regional integration forward.  But social regulation (with distributional consequences) is an 
ineluctable tension in regional integration. Functionalism cannot arbitrate conflict about the 
                                                 
3   It therefore comes as no surprise that left/right only weakly frames public opinion on European integration. A 
variable that taps left/right self placement is significant under controls if allowance is made (via an interaction 
term) for the fact that in Scandinavia, in contrast to the rest of the EU, it is the left, not the right, that is more 
opposed to integration. But the size of the effect is small (Hooghe and Marks 2004).  
  9 allocation of authority in a multi-level polity. The struggle between left and right about social 
regulation leads to unstable and contested outcomes about the scope of policy, in which the 
level of policy—the degree of supranationalism—is a by-product reflecting which side 
happens to have authority at which level. 
  
Identity 
Functionalists and neofunctionalists alike stressed the constraining effects of national identity 
on integration. “We are favored by the need and the habit of material cooperation; we are 
hampered by the general clinging to political segregation. How to reconcile these two trends, 
both of them natural and both of them active, is the main problem for political invention at 
this juncture of history” (Mitrany 1948 [1966]: 151). But functionalists and neofunctionalists 
believed that national identity would ultimately give way to a more encompassing loyalty. 
According to Mitrany, national identity is just one, and not the most important kind of 
identity: “Each of us is in fact a bundle of functional loyalties; so that to build a world 
community upon such a conception is merely to extend and consolidate it also between 
national societies and groups” (1965 [1966]: 204). In one of the first analyses of public 
opinion on European integration, Ronald Inglehart predicted that a shift of loyalties was a 
matter of generational replacement. Younger cohorts, he argued, were being socialized in 
societies where nationalism was discredited and where supranational institutions were 
providing an expanding range of collective goods (Inglehart 1970: 182-190).  
Recent research arrives at a different verdict: national identity remains a supremely 
powerful constraint on preferences concerning the level of European integration (Carey 2002; 
Hooghe and Marks 2004; McLaren 2002; Hermann, Brewer, Risse eds. 2004). This is true 
both for political parties and for the general public.  
  As noted above, national identity connects to the second dimension of conflict across 
western societies, which we describe as a Green/Alternative/Libertarian (or Gal) versus 
Traditionalist/Authoritarian/Nationalist (or Tan) dimension.  
  The position of a political party on the Gal/Tan dimension powerfully predicts its 
position on European issues that engage the level of integration. So, as Table 2 reveals, party 
location on Gal/Tan is strongly associated with positioning on European integration in general 
and on the powers of the European Parliament. The association is anchored on the right side 
of this dimension by parties with a strong Tan leaning—e.g. the Front National, Vlaams 
Blok/Belang, Austrian Freiheitlichepartei, and Danske Folkspartiet. This is a relatively new 
phenomenon. In 1984, the first year for which we have data on party positioning, the main 
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the mid-1990s was the largest reservoir of opposition on the radical right (Hooghe, Marks, 
Wilson 2002; Taggart 1998). Such parties oppose integration because it undermines national 
sovereignty. They link European integration to other perceived threats to the national 
community: foreign cultural influences, cosmopolitan elites, international agencies, and above 
all, immigrants. 
Table 2: Gal/Tan Positioning and Position on Institutional EU Policies (correlations) 
 West  East 
EP Powers  – 0.50  – 0.57 
Enlargement  – 0.38  – 0.71 
General Position  – 0.30  – 0.65 
Note: Data from the 2002 Chapel Hill party expert dataset, tapping 238 country experts to evaluate the 
ideological and EU policy locations of 98 political parties in the West (EU-15 minus Luxembourg) and 73 in the 
East (EU-10 minus Cyprus, Estonia and Malta). Experts locate parties on a scale from 1 (strongly opposed) to 7 
(strongly favoring). Parties weighted by vote percentage in most recent national election. 
EP Powers: “Take the position of the party leadership on the powers of the European Parliament. Some parties 
want more powers for the European Parliament. Other parties argue there is no need to expand the powers of the 
European Parliament further.” 
Enlargement (West): “Consider enlargement to Central- and Eastern European countries. Some parties believe 
that the new countries should have exactly the same rights and duties as existing members. Others believe there 
should be separate rules for them (e.g. on agricultural policy, cohesion policy, internal market, movement of 
people, currency).” 
Enlargement (East): “Consider EU enlargement to the candidate countries of postcommunist Europe. Some 
parties strongly support major domestic reforms to qualify for EU membership as soon as possible. Other parties 
oppose major domestic reforms to qualify for EU membership as soon as possible.” 
General Position: “How would you describe the general position to European integration that the party’s 
leadership has taken over the course of 2002?”  
  
National identity also mobilizes Euroskepticism in conservative parties with a national 
character—as in Britain, France, Ireland, and Spain. Conservative parties in these countries 
combine defense of the national community with support for market solutions. European 
integration puts these in tension, and fuels conflict between market liberals, who are willing to 
water down national sovereignty in the cause of market competition, and nation-oriented 
traditionalists, who are not. The result is internal party dissension that in some cases—the 
British Conservatives and the French Gaullists—has threatened to tear these parties apart.  
By the mid-1990s, the political mobilization of national identity led to the 
“dextrification” of opposition to European integration. Enlargement to Central- and Eastern 
Europe has reinforced—not weakened—this. The strongest opposition to European 
  11 integration in Central and Eastern, as in Western Europe, is found among parties that espouse 
traditionalist, nation-centered ideologies (Marks et al. 2004). 
National identity also constrains public opinion on European integration, but in a 
double-edged way. On the one hand, national identity and European identity reinforce each 
other. In his dissertation on the topic, Richard Haesly (2001) finds a positive, rather than 
negative, association between being Welsh or Scottish and European. European allegiance can 
fruitfully be conceived as embedded in national allegiance (van Kersbergen 2000).  
But it is also true that many opponents of European integration see themselves as 
defending their nations against control from Brussels. Diez Medrano details how national 
histories condition the consequences of national identity for support for European integration: 
English Euroskepticism is rooted in Britain’s special history of empire, West German pro-
Europeanism reflects Second World War guilt; the Spanish tend to support European 
integration as proxy for modernization and democratization (2003; see also Stråth and 
Triandafyllidou 2003). 
National identities are formed early in life, as Inglehart recognized in his 1970 piece. 
Children as young as six or seven know full well whether they are English, German, or 
Swedish. But the impact of identity on political attitudes is neither automatic nor uniform. 
The connection between a person’s identity and her attitude toward European integration is 
constructed in political debate, and that construction is cued by national political parties, 
national elites, and national media. Where the political elite is more or less united on Europe, 
national identity and European integration tend to coexist; where it is divided, national 
identity feeds Euroskepticism (Hooghe and Marks 2004).  
  Neofunctionalists recognized that regional integration had to be understood as a 
broadly-based political process that engaged a variety of domestic actors, not just national 
governments. The history of European integration since the tumultuous reception of the 
Maastricht Accord in 1992 has confirmed this insight. But did neofunctionalists get the sign 
of the effect right?
4  
If one were to extrapolate the experience of contestation over redistribution and 
identity described above, one would be compelled to answer “no.” Politicization appears to 
be—at least at this point in history—neither positive, nor open-ended, with respect to regional 
                                                 
4   In a recent publication, Philippe Schmitter acknowledges that neofunctionalist theory underestimated the 
enduring character of national identity and its constraining effect on European integration (2002). As we have 
noted, this criticism is least appropriate for Schmitter’s own work. 
  12 integration. If recent research is valid, politicization is powerfully shaped by nationalist 
reaction against perceived loss of community and national sovereignty.  
In retrospect, it seems unexceptional that a quantum shift in authority—which is, after 
all, what sixty years of European integration adds up to—should jolt nationally embedded 
emotions. A student of modern European history might heed a simple warning: “Never 
underestimate nationalism.” Group attachments can be extraordinarily powerful, and few 
more so than attachments to territorially-defined communities. The mobilization of exclusive 
national identity in defense of national sovereignty is therefore a predictable reaction to 
Europeanization.  
Neofunctionalists and functionalists feared as much, and they urged a course of 
incremental steps that would lead Europe around, not through, national identity. This was the 
guiding principle of the Monnet method, a neofunctionalist strategy prior to the theory 
(Duchêne 1994). Mitrany believed that the creation of multiple functional regimes would 
defuse nationalist reaction, that it was better that authority seep away from national states in 
several directions, rather than to a single new center.  
 
 
POLITICIZATION AND THE FORM OF MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE 
The politicization of integration, and in particular the mobilization of national identity, has 
constrained European political architecture. The functional logic of regional integration is as 
strong as it ever was, but the institutional strategy is changing. Instead of bundling an ever 
more extensive set of policies in a coherent European federal polity—a common set of 
policies for a given territory—we have seen a growing dissociation between territory and 
function. The result is a system of multi-level governance which takes on the characteristics 
of a consortio modified by growing reliance on condominio.  
Practicing neofunctionalists, including Jean Monnet, conceived their challenge to be 
building Europe in the absence of Europeans. They believed that Europeans could be created 
indirectly, as citizens felt the policy effects of regional integration, and transferred their 
loyalties accordingly. Regional integration was to be built piecemeal, in the confident 
expectation that the emergent polity would be considered legitimate. Their strategy was to 
shift an ever wider set of competencies from national states to Europe. Each act of integration 
was justified in its own terms, but the effect was to transform European political architecture 
in a federal direction. This strategy survived Charles de Gaulle in the 1960s and Margaret 
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piecemeal integration where justified on efficiency grounds.  
From a functionalist standpoint, a federal Euro-stato  would be a king with no 
functional clothes—as Mitrany wrote in a blistering critique of Walter Hallstein’s federal 
plans (Mitrany 1965). A European federation was a political goal cherished by postwar elites 
who contended with the absence of Europeans. In more recent times, reformers have had to 
confront, in addition, the presence of populist nationalism. No major policy area has escaped 
Europeanization to some degree, but domestic support for European supranationalism is as 
weak as it has ever been. Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe appears to have 
hardened rather than softened the edge of national opposition, as one might expect in 
countries that have been denied independence for so long (Taggart and Sczerbiak 2004). At 
the extreme, minorities in several EU member states appear willing to sacrifice functional 
benefits of cooperation on the altar of national sovereignty. While their numbers are 
proportionately low, they threaten to take political advantage of the gap that exists in every 
EU society between Europhile elites and a more skeptical public. The nationalist right appears 
most threatening in referenda, which ironically enough, constitute the most important 
institutional innovation in domestic liberal polities occasioned by European integration.  
How can one reap the collective gains of transnational cooperation without running 
foul of national identity? This is the challenge for elites seeking to safeguard the functional 
benefits of cooperation (Hooghe 2003). Their answer appears consistent with the following 
principles:
5 
•  Focus on policy problems for which decision making can convey transparent benefits 
to stakeholders.  
•  Splice policy problems into discrete chunks. Minimize policy externalities; maximize 
decomposability. 
•  Tailor decision rules to the particular task at hand.  
•  To the extent that pareto optimal solutions involve redistribution, pick problems where 
side-payments are feasible. 
What kind of polity would emerge if cooperation on certain functions was desirable, but 
member states tailored it to the problem rather than to existing European institutions? 
Independent European agencies for, among others things, aviation, drug addiction, the 
                                                 
5   Elsewhere we describe this as Type 2 governance, oriented around task-specific jurisdictions, which can be 
contrasted with Type 1 governance, oriented around general-purpose jurisdictions (Hooghe and Marks 2003). 
  14 environment, food safety, maritime safety, medical product evaluation, satellites, training, 
work safety and health, and vocational training are examples. And what if certain forms of 
integration were considered efficient for some member states, but not for others? This 
question was raised sharply for monetary union and for social policy, and the institutional 
solution has been to allow individual member states to derogate, i.e. opt out, if they so wish.  
Philippe Schmitter, who saw more clearly than any of his contemporaries the storm 
gathering over Maastricht, speculated about the form that regional integration might be 
taking. “What if either the functional or the territorial domains (and even more if both) were 
not congruent with the same authority?” (1996: 132). Schmitter diagnosed three alternatives 
to a federal state. A confederatio is a loose arrangement in which territorial units may enter or 
exit at will but where functional competencies are rigorously fixed in order to protect 
members from encroachment by central authorities. In a consortio a fixed number of national 
authorities cooperate on a variety of functional tasks through specific, flexible, and 
overlapping institutional arrangements. And finally “the most unprecedented, even 
unimaginable, outcome of all” (136) is the condominio, where both  territorial units and 
functional tasks vary to create multiple specialized, flexible, and overlapping regimes. 
“Instead of one Europe with recognized and contiguous boundaries, there would be many 
Europes. Instead of a Eurocracy accumulating organizationally distinct but politically 
coordinated tasks around a single center, there could be multiple regional institutions acting 
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